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a worker who labors on land? This problem is of importance not
only to the seaman and the shipowner but to the public at large, be-
cause it is the public who ultimately will bear the burden of taxation
necessary to finance the large subsidies paid to maintain the ship-
ping industry. It is to be hoped that by focusing attention on the
problem, a solution satisfactory to all parties may be reached.
A
AIR CARRIERS-NOTICE OF CLAIM AND TIME FOR SUIT
LIMITATIONS
Introduction
No action may be maintained for injury to, or death of, a pas-
senger, unless notice of claim in writing is presented to the general
office of the carrier within ninety days following the occurrence of
the event giving rise thereto, and unless the action is actually com-
menced within one year after such occurrence.
This is a typical clause utilized by many air carriers 1 for the
alleged purpose of protecting themselves from fraudulent claims. The
thought is that prompt notice to the carrier permits an investigation
as to the nature of an injured passenger's claim. The fraudulently
disposed passenger-one whose injuries seem to multiply with the
passage of time-is thus discouraged from capitalizing on the staleness
of his claim.
The bona fide passenger, however, is likewise subject to the pro-
vision. His is a helpless plight, for in most instances, he is not even
aware of the existence of such a condition to the carrier's liability.
He would naturally assume that the pertinent statute of limitations
constitutes the only yardstick as to the time within which he may move
against the carrier to remedy his hurts.
The manner by which the carrier renders this clause operative
is manifestly unfair to passengers. It is the purpose of this note to
examine the inequity of this practice with a view of challenging its
validity.
The air carrier of passengers is the primary target, although
other common carriers must be considered for historical purposes, and
by way of analogy. Personal injury claims of passengers will be
I See McKay, Airline Tariff Provisions as a Bar to Actions for Personal
Injuries, 18 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 160 (1950); 1953 U. S. & CAN. AVIATION
REip. 198, 199 (C. A. B. Docket No. 6149) (The Civil Aeronautics Board is
investigating the reasonableness and lawfulness of such a provision.).
chiefly treated as opposed to those for property damage. Notice of
claim time provisions will be stressed over the time for suit provisions,
for the considerations that apply to the former, of necessity, have a
similar effect upon the latter.
Time Provision Expressed in Contract
Railroad Carriers
The notice of claim provision is not of recent vintage. Its valid-
ity was proclaimed in 1874 by the United States Supreme Court in
Express Company v'. Caldwell.2 The common carrier and shipper
expressly agreed that in the event of loss or damage to property, the
carrier would not be responsible therefor, unless notice of claim be
given to the carrier within ninety days after delivery. In a suit by
the shipper for the loss of certain parcels, the carrier sought refuge
behind the provision. Finding in favor of the carrier, the Court held
that the express agreement between the parties was reasonable, and
hence not against public policy. It did not tend to relieve the common
carrier from its duties, but only served to aid it, in the event of loss
or damage, to a prompt ascertainment of the facts.
The oft-cited Gooch v. Oregon Short Line Railroad 3 was the
first case dealing with notice of claim provisions in personal injury
suits to reach the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiff procured
a drover's pass to act as caretaker for the cattle that he was shipping.
In consideration of the pass, the passenger and carrier expressly stip-
ulated that if any injury befell the former during the journey, the
carrier would not be liable unless written notice of claim were pre-
sented to it within thirty days after the injury. Plaintiff incurred
injuries which led to his maintenance of this suit. The carrier de-
fended on the ground that plaintiff failed to comply with the provi-
sion. The plaintiff was nonsuited, and upon the eventual appeal to
the Federal Supreme Court, the judgment of nonsuit was affirmed-
three Justices dissenting. The Court held that the thirty-day re-
quirement was valid and reasonable as to a personal injury claim,
even though Congress had expressly provided as to property damage,
that the carrier may not require a notice of claim of less than ninety
days.
The highest court of the land has also indicated its approval of
a time for suit limitation exacted by a common carrier. Thus, in
1913, where the contract between the carrier and shipper provided
that suit for property damage must be commenced within ninety days,
the Court upheld the provision by ruling that parties may, by express
221 Wall. 264 (U. S. 1874).
3258 U. S. 22 (1922).
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contract, provide for a shorter time limitation, provided that the time
is not unreasonably short.4
Thus, as to railroad common carriers, the provision, when ex-
pressed in the contract, both as to property damage and personal in-
jury suits, had only to be reasonable, and it would have been upheld.
However, in 1915, Congress amended the Interstate Commerce Act,
as to property damage claims, by altering the "reasonableness" stan-
dard, to wit, that it would be unlawful for a common carrier to pro-
vide by contract or regulation for a shorter period for giving notice
of claim than ninety days, for filing of claim than four months, and
for the institution of suit than two years.5 In 1930, however, the Act
was further amended by omitting the provision for notice of claim,
and extending the time for filing of claim from four months to nine
months-the time for institution of suit being retained at two years.6
Water Carriers
It has been said that a steamship ticket is a contract with respect
to the voyage in question, the contents of which bind the passenger
whether or not he reads it.7 Notice of claim provisions with respect
to water carriage have been sustained, therefore, if the provision
formed, in fact, a part of the contract of carriage. Thus, where it
appeared on the face of a steamship ticket that written notice of claim
for personal injury must be made within forty days after debarkation,
the court held that since the provision was a part of the contract
proper, the passenger was bound by it, even though, in fact, he was
ignorant of its existence.8 Yet, even though the provision may appear
on the face of the steamship ticket, it will not bind the passenger un-
less it be reasonable.9 If the provision appears on the back of the
ticket, and nothing on its face indicates such fact, then it is not part
of the contract, and the passenger is not bound thereby unless it be
brought to his knowledge. 10 Conversely, where it clearly appears on
the face of the ticket, that the passenger should read the reverse
4 Missouri, K & T. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657 (1913).
538 STAT. 1197 (1915), Southern Pac. R. Co. of Mexico v. Gonzalez,
48 Ariz. 260, 61 P. 2d 377 (1936) (Thirty-day notice of claim provision was
struck down as violative of the federal statute.).
646 STAT. 252 (1930), 49 U. S. C. § 20(11) (1946).
7 See Steers v. Liverpool, N. Y. & Phil. S.S. Co., 57 N. Y. 1, 5 (1874).8 Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N. Y. 162, 139 N. E. 226 (1923); cf.
Sterling Amusement Co. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 61 Misc. 603,
113 N. Y. Supp. 1032 (Sup. Ct. 1909) ; Garcin v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique, 160 Misc. 687, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1075 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936).
9 See Blackwell v. Alaska S.S. Co., 1 F. 2d 334 (W. D. Wash. 1923)
(Ten-day notice of claim provision for personal injury held unreasonable and
against public policy.).
10 Bellocchio v. Italia Flotte Riunite Cosulich Line Lloyd Sabaudo Navi-
gazione Generale, 84 F. 2d 975 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Baer v. North German Lloyd,
69 F. 2d 88 (2d Cir. 1934).
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side, in that event, the passenger is bound whether or not he reads it,
the provision being deemed a part of the contract."1 However, where
a legend-notice to read reverse side-appears on the face of the
ticket, but which itself is not a part of the contract proper, then the
provision referred to, is not a part of the contract, and the passenger
is not bound thereby.'2
Where written notice of claim is required, mere oral notice will
not suffice.18 Then again, the fact that the injured passenger is a
minor does not excuse him from compliance with the notice of claim
clause of the ticket on which he traveled. 14 Where a fifteen-day notice
of claim was required, it has been held immaterial that the passenger's
injuries were not yet fully ascertained, for a general statement of in-
juries, as far as known, should have been given. 15
Time for suit limitations are likewise enforceable if found to have
been a part of the contract of carriage. Thus, where the provision
appeared on the ticket, it has been held that, even though the decedent
was a three-year-old infant traveling on his mother's ticket, the time
limitation of one year was binding.16
Originally, as to both property damage and personal injury
suits, it was required merely that all provisions be "just and reason-
able." 17 However, in 1935, a minimum standard, as to personal
injury and death actions, was added to the Shipping Act, namely, that
it would be unlawful to provide by contract or regulation for a shorter
period for giving notice of, or filing claim, than six months, and for
the institution of suits on such 'claims, than one year.' 8 Thus it
has been held that where a state statute of limitations would be other-
wise applicable, it must yield to the aforementioned federal statute
where interstate transportation is concerned.' 9 This is so, even
though the state may have a statute which declares void any period
less than that state's pertinent statute of limitations.2 0
11 Rosenthal v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 170 Misc. 426, 12
N. Y. S. 2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1939).12 The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375 (1897); Maibrunn v. Hamburg-American
S.S. Co., 77 F. 2d 304 (2d Cir. 1935).
23 See Translateur v. United States Lines Co., 179 Misc. 840, 842, 42 N. Y.
S. 2d 114, 110 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 179 Misc. 843, 42 N. Y. S. 2d
117 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1943).
14 The Finland, 35 F. 2d 47 (E. D. N. Y. 1929).
S The Majestic, 30 F. 2d 822 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
'
6 Lee v. Swedish American Line, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
1739 STAT. 735 (1916), 46 U. S. C. § 817 (1946); see W. R. Grace & Co.
v. Panama R. R., 12 F. 2d 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 715 (1926)(property damage); Blackwell v. Alaska S.S. Co., 1 F. 2d 334 (W. D. Wash.
1923) (personal injuries).Is49 STAT. 960 (1935), 46 U. S. C. §183b (1946).
19 Scheibel v. Agwilines, Inc., 156 F. 2d 636 (2d Cir. 1946); FLA. STAT.
§95.11(4) (1951) (The pertinent Florida statute of limitations for personal
injury actions was four years.).
2°FLA. STAT. § 95.03 (1951) (A contract provision which purports to fix
1953]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Civil Aeronautics Act
With the commercialization of the airplane as a medium of trans-
portation for both passenger and cargo, the Federal Government
found it necessary, in 1938, to enact appropriate legislation. Thus
was born the Civil Aeronautics Act.2' As set forth in its caption, it
was enacted ". . . to promote the development and safety and to
provide for the regulation of civil aeronautics." 22
As a product of this legislation, the Civil Aeronautics Board
came into being to provide the physical agency for the promulgation
of the Act's ends. 23  It is composed of five members who are ap-
pointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.24
Tariffs
The Civil Aeronautics Act expressly requires that every air
carrier ". . . shall file with the Board, and print, and keep open to
public inspection, tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air
transportation between points served by it . . . and showing to the
extent required by regulations of the Board, all classifications, rules,
regulations, practices, and services in connection with such air trans-
portation." 25 Thus, since air carriers are expressly required by
statute to file these tariffs, its contents-those items required by statute
and the Board's regulations to be included therein-bind the carrier
and passenger as a matter of law.26 And it matters not that the pas-
senger had no actual knowledge of a specific regulation.
a period of time for institution of suit at less than that provided by state statute
of limitations is void.).
2152 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. (1946); see HOTCHKiss,
THE LAW OF AVIATION 99 et seq. (2d ed. 1938). Its predecessor was the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 568 (1926); see DAVIS, AERONAUTICAL
LAW 74 et seq. (1930) ; Ballard, Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARv. L.
REv. 1235, 1237-1241 (1947).
2252 STAT. 973 (1938).
23 52 STAT. 980 (1938) (originally known as Civil Aeronautics Authority),
as amended, 54 STAT. 1235 (1940), 49 U. S. C. §421 (1946) (now known as
Civil Aeronautics Board).
24 Ibid. Its principal office is in the District of Columbia, but it may
conduct hearings elsewhere, when the exigencies of a particular situation render
it necessary. Ibid. As a condition to the engagement in air transportation, an
air carrier must apply to the Board for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity. 52 STAT. 1235 (1940), 49 U. S. C. §481 (1946).
2552 STAT. 992 (1938), as amended, 54 STAT. 1235 (1940), 49 U. S. C.
§483 (a) (1946); see Markham and Blair, The Effect of Tariff Provisions
Filed Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15 J. AIR L. & Com. 251 (1948).
26 See Shortley v. Northwestern Airlines, 104 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. D. C.
1952) ; cf. Turner, Dennis & Lowry Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.,
271 U. S. 259, 263 (1926); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co.,
256 U. S. 566, 573 (1921); Boston & M. R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 112,
113, 121 (1914).
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As stated earlier, notice of claim and time for suit provisions
will generally be sustained as valid, where the time is reasonable, and
where the parties have expressly contracted with respect to such pro-
visions. This advantage is bestowed upon the carrier so that it can
protect itself against stale and fraudulent claims.2 7 However, it seems
that air carriers are, and have been of late, so distorting the use of
such provisions, that in effect, they are not only protecting themselves
from tardy claims, but adroitly escaping liability as well. The man-
ner by which they accomplish the latter end is by the insertion of such
time provisions in their filed tariffs.
Mere perusal of the Civil Aeronautics Act discloses the fact
that there is no explicit requirement nor authority for the inclusion
in the tariff of such provisions. However, the contents of a tariff are
measured by the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board.28  Sec-
tion 221.4(g) of the Board's Economic Regulations provides that a
tariff shall contain "[g] eneral rules which govern the tariff, i.e., state
conditions which in any way affect the rates named in the tariff, or
the service under such rates." 29 The problem that presents itself is
manifest, namely, whether notice of claim and time for suit provisions
are rules within the contemplation of the foregoing regulation. If
properly considered as such, then their presence in a carrier's filed
tariff will bind the passenger irrespective of his knowledge thereof.3 0
Conversely, if such time provisions are not authorized rules, they
are not required to be included in a carrier's tariff, and consequently
do not bind the passenger as a matter of law.31
It would seem that a time provision is not a rule within the
meaning of the Board's regulations. Brief analysis of the regulations
will serve to support this conclusion. Section 221.4(g) of the
Board's Economic Regulations provides, as above mentioned, that
the tariff shall contain rules which affect the rates named in the tariff,
or the service under such rates.3 2 Section 221.1 (d) defines a tariff
as ". .. a publication containing rates applicable to the transporta-
tion of persons or property, and rules relating to or affecting such
rates or transportation .... ,,33 Since a time provision clearly and
27See Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 258 U. S. 22, 24-25 (1922);
South & Central American Com. Co. v. Panama R. R., 237 N. Y. 287, 292,
142 N. E. 666, 668 (1923); Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N. Y. 162, 165,
139 N. E. 226, 228 (1923).
28 See statute cited, supra note 25.
29 14 CODE FED. RaGs. § 221.4(g) (Rev. ed. 1952).
30 See note 26 stpra.
31 See Pacific S.S. Co. v. Cackette, 8 F. 2d 259 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied,
269 U. S. 586 (1926); Thomas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 650
(E. D. Ark. 1952) ; Toman v. Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 345
(W. D. Mo. 1952); Shortley v. Northwestern Airlines, 104 F. Supp. 152
(D. D. C. 1952).
32 See note 29 supra.
33 14 CODE FED. REGs. § 221.1(d) (Rev. ed. 1952) (emphasis added).
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indisputably cannot be considered a rule which affects a carrier's
rates, it is not a rule that is required by the Board to be included in
the carrier's filed tariff. Is a time provision a rule which affects
"service under such rates"? The use of transportation in Section
221.1 (d), to be deemed logical and consistent, would necessarily be
substitutional for service under such rates as used in Section
22 1.4(g). Further, by virtue of the carrier-passenger relationship
alone, the service of a common carrier can connote nothing other
than the duties of a carrier toward its passengers with respect to their
transportation. Thus, the question may now be phrased: Is a time
provision a rule which affects the carrier's transportation of its pas-
sengers? A time provision is utilized wholly for the carrier's benefit.
It exacts compliance therewith only of the passengers, yet transporta-
tion of passengers implies the exercise of duties by the carrier.8 4 It
would seem, therefore, that a time provision is not a rule which af-
fects the service of a carrier. Thus it is not a rule that is required
by the Board to be included in the carrier's tariff.
If the foregoing conclusions be correct-that the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act and the Board's regulations do not require the inclusion of
time provisions in the carrier's tariff-it would follow that they do not
bind the passenger as a matter of law.35 The carrier would, there-
fore, be inserting such provisions in its tariff of its own volition.
However, there is still another theory by which the time pro-
visions may be rendered operative upon the passenger. The time
provisions are not expressed on the transportation ticket, but the
mere legend generally appears thereon: "sold subject to tariff regu-
lations." Should the passenger be contractually bound thereby, even
though he may not have knowledge of the specific time provision?
Such would seem possible under the theory of incorporation by ref-
erence, under which the legend may constitute a sufficient reference
to the tariff regulations so as to incorporate the contents of the tariff
into the contract of carriage.3 6 It would be incumbent on the pas-
senger to heed the legend-notice and examine the pertinent tariff
regulations. It would appear, however, that the theory of incorpora-
tion by reference, under these peculiar circumstances, should not be
applicable. Here, a common carrier is a contracting party. The effect
of its contract tends to exempt it from liability for its wrongs to the
public. Here, therefore, public policy steps in as an interested party.
Public policy will not throttle the carrier's freedom to contract en-
tirely, but will only force it to make a clearer and fairer contract with
34 See McKay, Airline Tariff Provisions as a Bar to Actions for Personal
Injuries, 18 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 160, 166 (1950).
35 See note 31 supra.
36 See Matter of Bd. of Comm'rs of Washington Pk., 52 N. Y. 131, 134(1873) ; Jones v. Cunard S.S. Co., 238 App. Div. 172, 173, 263 N. Y. Supp.
769, 771 (2d Dep't 1933); Scott's Valley Fruit Exchange v. Growers Refrig.
Co., 81 Cal. App. 2d 437, 184 P. 2d 183, 189 (1947).
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its passenger. 87 The passenger, therefore, would seem to deserve
more enlightening notice than the mere legend---"sold subject to tariff
regulations."
Under either theory, whether considered as a proper rule to
be filed or as part of the contract by reference, a time provision, ren-
dered operative by virtue of its being inserted in the carrier's tariff,
works a gross inequity upon passengers. The following practical
considerations may serve to illustrate the manner by which carriers
are taking unfair advantage of their passengers.
Few passengers ever read the transportation ticket.88 Then also,
the tickets are taken from their possession too soon.8 9 Even if the
ticket is scrutinized, "subject to tariff regulations" means nothing to
most passengers. The handful that do understand the legend, and do
have cognizance of what the Civil Aeronautics Act and the Board's
regulations provide, would never expect to find such time provisions
included in the tariff.40  Why? Because the Civil Aeronautics Act
and the Board's regulations do not require nor authorize the insertion
of such clauses in the filed tariff. It is inconceivable, therefore, that
the passenger should nonetheless be bound by any type of provision
that the carrier may gratuitously or surreptitiously or even whimsi-
cally insert in its tariff. Then again, the extreme minority, who, by
some freak of chance, do know of the time clauses, may themselves
be so severely injured, or the extent of their injuries may not yet be
fully ascertained, that written notice of claim would not be prac-
ticable within a short time.41 The latter argument applies also to a
shortened time for suit provision. The unfair advantage thus taken
by the carriers may be pointedly summarized: Human nature and
its attendant frailties should be considered by the carrier, and not
exploited.
In view of the foregoing, it would seem fantastic that a court
would enforce such "phantom" provisions against passengers. How-
ever, there are some such decisions. Of these, Wilhelny v. North-
west Airlines 42 appears worthy of extended treatment. That was a
3 See Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 27 (1879); cf. Express Co.
v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, 267 (U. S. 1874) (The Court held a ninety-day notice
of claim valid and not against public policy. It may be noticed, however, that
here the parties expressly agreed to the provision.). See also RicHARDsoN,
BArLmENrS AND CARRIERs 95 et seq. (1926).
38 See Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R. R., 258 U. S. 22, 30-31 (1922) (dis-
senting opinion).
39 See Bellocchio v. Italia Flotte Riunite Cosulich Line Lloyd Sabaudo Navi-
gazione Generale, 84 F. 2d 975, 976 (2d Cir. 1936) ; Blackwell v. Alaska S.S.
Co., I F. 2d 334, 335 (W. D. Wash. 1923).
40 See Boston & M. R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 156 (1914) (dissenting
opinion).
41 See Gerin v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 133 Minn. 395, 158 N. W. 630, 631(1916). But see The Majestic, 30 F. 2d 822 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
42 86 F. Supp. 565 (W. D. Wash. 1949); see Note, 13 A. L. R. 2d 337,
342-343 (1950).
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personal injury suit by a passenger, where the defendant air carrier
affirmatively defended on the ground that the passenger failed to com-
ply with a requirement that written notice of claim be presented with-
in thirty days, and that suit be actually commenced within one year.
This provision was contained in the air carrier's filed tariff-a mere
legend, "sold subject to tariff regulations," appearing on the ticket.
The court held that the legend appearing on the ticket was effective
to charge plaintiff-passenger with notice of the contents of the filed
tariff, and that included the time provisions as to notice of claim, and
time for suit.
The rationale for the court's so ruling does not clearly appear in
the reported decision. It would seem, however, that it was grounded
on the doctrine of incorporation by reference. Thus the reference
"sold subject to tariff regulations" may have been considered effective
to incorporate into the contract of carriage the contents of the car-
rier's tariff, which included the time provisions. The passenger would
be bound thereby, irrespective of his actual knowledge thereof, for he
had contracted with the carrier with reference to such time provi-
sions. Ordinarily, the reference will be held sufficient if it can fairly
be said that the passenger will notice it, and if the matter attempted
to be incorporated into the contract is properly described and iden-
tified.48 As mentioned earlier, however, the effect of such a contract,
if enforced, would tend to relieve a common carrier from liability
for its wrongs to the public.44  Public policy, therefore, jealously
scrutinizes such contracts of common carriers. In view of this policy,
it cannot be said that the legend "sold subject to tariff regulations"
is a sufficient reference to charge the passenger with knowledge of the
time provisions included in the carrier's tariff. Thus it would appear
that if the court grounded its decision on the theory that the time
provisions were incorporated into the contract of carriage by virtue
of the reference on the transportation ticket, the strong public policy
against such a contract was either ignored or lightly considered.
As to the other theory upon which the time provision in ques-
tion may have been sustained as a defense, namely, that it was a rule
which was required to be included in the carrier's filed tariff, thus
43 See Matter of Bd. of Comm'rs of Washington Pk., 52 N. Y. 131, 134(1873) ; Jones v. Cunard S.S. Co., 238 App. Div. 172, 173, 174, 263 N. Y. Supp.
769, 771, 772 (2d Dep't 1933) ; Scott's Valley Fruit Exchange v. Growers
Refrig. Co., 81 Cal. App. 2d 437, 184 P. 2d 183, 189 (1947) ; see Los Angeles
Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293,
298 (1919).
44 ,,... [T]he record in this case shows that the rule [notice of claim
provision] has trapped a large number of claimants; that it can be and has
been used to deny liability for claims of victims of a major airplane accident,
an event known to the carrier shortly after its occurrence. The rule is, there-
fore, a device which serves to defeat the normal liability of a common
carrier." Continental Charters, Inc., Complaint of Battista, 1952 U. S. & CAN.
AVIATioN RF'. 472, 475 (C. A. B. Docket No. 5573, 1953).
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being capable of binding the passenger as a matter of law, this the
court did not consider. It cannot be said, however, that the issue-
whether or not a time provision may properly be inserted in a car-
rier's tariff-was not called to the attention of the court. The plain-
tiff himself did so, for that was the basis of his contention. The
court, however, dispelled such contention by a ruling that the decision
that plaintiff relied upon, Pacific S.S. Co. v. Cackette,45 was not ap-
plicable, because in that case, the ten-day notice of claim requirement
was considered unreasonable and invalid. 46 It was at this exact point
that the court stumbled, for a perusal of the Cackette decision will
disclose the fact that this was erroneously distinguished. That case
did not hold what the court in the Wilhelmy case claimed it did. But
it did hold what the plaintiff contended, and it certainly was applicable.
The Cackette case clearly held that since the carrier's filed tariff con-
tained a provision-ten-day notice of claim-that was not required
by statute to be included therein, the provision was not binding upon
the passenger so as to charge him with notice thereof. Assuming
that the Wilhelny decision was not grounded solely on the theory of
incorporation by reference, had the court taken proper cognizance
of the Cackette case, it would then have been forced to decide whether
or not a time provision could properly be included in a carrier's filed
tariff, and the effect thereof, if permitted to be so filed. In short,
this much, at least, may be gleaned from the Wilhelmy case: The
court may have enforced the time provision on the ground that it was
sufficiently referred to, so as to constitute it a part of the contract of
carriage. Irrespective or inclusive of the foregoing, the court may
have assumed that a time provision may lawfully be included in a
carrier's filed tariff. Its effect then would be to bind the passenger
as a matter of law. Yet this deduction is not probable, for the reason
that the court did not refute the rule of the Cackette case-it falsely
distinguished it. If it had taken proper cognizance of the Cackette
decision, and then ruled contrarily to it, then the above assumption
might have ripened into a reality. Here, as has been seen, it ruled
contrarily to the Cackette case in result, but did not recognize the
true holding of that case.
In 1951, two years after the eventful Wilhelmy decision, the
court, in Herman v. Capitol Airlines, Inc.,47 followed the former case
by ruling, on similar facts, that since the tariff which contained the
time provisions was duly filed, it formed a part of the contract of
transportation, thus binding the passenger. It may be added, that
although this case actually followed the rule of the Wilhelmy decision,
it did not mention its name in the course of the reported opinion.
45 8 F. 2d 259 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U. S. 586 (1926).
46 See Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines; 86 F. Supp. 565, 567 (W. D.
Wash. 1949).
47 104 F. Supp. 955 (S. D. N. Y. 1951).
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It may be noticed that the Herman case did not consider the issue as
to whether time provisions may properly be included in the carrier's
tariff. The court may, however, as in the Wilhelmy case, have as-
sumed that it was a proper subject of inclusion in a tariff, and ruled
in accordance therewith. It may be said, therefore, that if the theory
of incorporation by reference was not the sole basis for the decisions,
the cases arouse the implication, at least, that a time provision is a
rule which may be properly included in a carrier's filed tariff. In
this, however, the Wilhelmy and Herman decisions seem to stand
alone.
It is heartening to discover that three cases in 1952,48 on similar
facts, contrary to the implications aroused by the Wilhelmy and
Herman decisions, lend direct support to the rule established by the
Cackette case. The courts recognized and restated the concededly
well-settled tenet that all regulations included in the carrier's filed
tariff bind the passenger as a matter of law, irrespective of his actual
knowledge thereof. However, the three courts, ruling as it were in
unison, limited the effect of the rule by the qualification that where a
carrier's filed tariff contains a provision which is neither required
nor authorized by statute or by the Board's regulations to be so in-
serted therein, the passenger is not charged with knowledge thereof.
The provision referred to, of course, was either a notice of claim
or time for suit requirement. The above ruling is reasonable. Were
this not so, a carrier might insert any provision it so desires in its
tariff, thereby seeking to bind the passenger merely by the effect of
its being duly filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Warsaw Convention
In view of the fact that a time provision may be utilized by air
carriers engaged in international transportation, it may be well to
consider the nature of the Warsaw Convention.
In 1929, an international convention was formulated and adopted
to regulate the liability of air carriers engaged in international trans-
portation.49 This treaty numbers among its signatories nearly all
48 Thomas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 650 (E. D. Ark. 1952)
(The court cited and followed the Cackette case.); Toman v. Mid-Continent
Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 345 (W. D. Mo. 1952) (The court stated that the
Wilhelny decision has not been followed; and expressed a doubt as to whether
the C. A. B., unless expressly authorized by statute, even had the right to ap-
prove time-provision rules.); Shortley v. Northwestern Airlines, 104 F. Supp.
152 (D. D. C. 1952) (The court added that plaintiff may have bound himself
contractually by acceptance of ticket which stated that it was subject to the
tariff provisions. But the court decided it was a question of fact as to whether
the passenger had actual knowledge, or such reasonable notice which was the
equivalent of actual knowledge.).
49 See RHaYNE, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 252, 253 (1947) ; Note, 13 A. L. R.
2d 337, 344 (1950).
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the larger nations of the world, the United States becoming a party
in 1934.50
To avail itself of the provisions of the Convention which may
exclude or limit its liability, the air carrier must satisfy and fulfill the
following requirements: (1) The flight in question must be con-
sidered international transportation within the meaning of the
treaty; 51 (2) The carrier must deliver a ticket to its passenger; 52
(3) The ticket must contain a statement that the transportation is
subject to the rules of the Warsaw Convention. 53 Where the rules
of the Convention are rendered operative, the carrier is exempt from
all liability if it proves that all necessary measures were taken to
avoid the damage, or it was impossible to take such measures. 54 In
any event, the carrier's liability for personal injuries is limited to
approximately $8,300, 55 unless the damage was caused by its wilful
misconduct, in which case, its liability is unlimited.56
Something akin to the typical notice of claim clause may be
found in the rules of the Convention, but it is applicable only to
damaged baggage or goods. As to baggage damage, the deliveree
must complain in writing to the carrier within three days after receipt
of it; as to goods, within seven days; yet if there has been a delay
as to either baggage or goods, then within fourteen days. 57  Unless
the complaint be made within the prescribed times, no action will lie
against the carrier. With respect to personal injury suits, there is
no notice of claim requirement, but there is a limitation as to time
for suit. Unless the action be commenced within two years, the action
will be barred.58
Notwithstanding the want of notice of claim provisions in the
Convention as to personal injury claims, it seems that they neverthe-
less are controlling when found to have been implemented as a part
of the contract of carriage. Thus, in Sheldon v. Pan American Air-
ways, Inc.,"0 a notice of claim provision of thirty days was enforced
as to a personal injury action of a passenger. It may be noticed,
however, that the provision was expressed in full on the transporta-
5o 49 STAT. 3000 (1934) ; see RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 49, at 253.








59 190 Misc. 537, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 578 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mere., 272 App. Div.
1000, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 267 (1st Dep't 1947); cf. Atlantic Fish & Oyster Co.
v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 1950 U. S. & CAN. AVATION REP. 23 (Cir.
Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1948). See also, Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan American
Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338 (S. D. N. Y. 1944) (motion to strike defense
of notice of claim denied).
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tion ticket itself. The flight was subject to the rules of the Warsaw
Convention, but the court ruled that there was no inconsistency be-
tween a notice of claim requirement of thirty days and the Convention
rule that suit must be commenced within two years-the two may
operate independently of each other. It may thus be seen, that inter-
national air carriers, although the flight be subject to the rules of the
Warsaw Convention, may exact notice of claim requirements from
their passengers as to personal injury claims, provided that the pro-
vision be expressed in full on the transportation ticket. This rule is
in keeping with that established in 1922, in Gooch v. Oregon Short
Line Railroad.60 It is, as mentioned earlier, a sound rule, for the
passenger has clearly contracted with the carrier with respect to the
notice of claim requirement. The fact that the passenger may not have
read the ticket, is of no consequence. The provision, being expressed
on the ticket, forms a part of the contract of transportation. Con-
tracts would be worth less than the paper upon which they are im-
pressed, if a contracting party were permitted to escape the perfor-
mance of his duties thereunder by the mere excuse that he did not
read any specific term or condition. It is clear, therefore, that it is not
objectionable for international air carriers to exact such a require-
ment, under the foregoing circumstances.
Although an international carrier may be subject to the rules of
the Warsaw Convention, it is also required to file tariffs with the
Civil Aeronautics Board. A problem, therefore, is presented where
the carrier includes in such filed tariff a notice of claim provision,
which is not likewise expressed on the transportation ticket. The
court, in Glenn v. Compania Cubana De Aviacion, S. A., 61 resolved
the foregoing against the carrier. The case concerned itself with a
wrongful death action, the air carrier defending on the ground that
its filed tariff contained a thirty-day notice of claim requirement, with
which the claimant failed to comply. The court, in rejecting the de-
fense, based its ruling on the ground that the provision was not
expressed on the ticket itself-thus not meeting the standard estab-
lished by the Gooch case. In thus holding, therefore, that the tariff
provision was not effective to constitute a defense to the carrier, the
court apparently assumed that such a tariff provision does not bind
the claimant as a matter of law, and based its ruling solely on the
carrier's failure to meet the ordinary contractual test established by
the Gooch case. Thus it would seem that if a carrier, engaged in
transportation subject to the rules of the Warsaw Convention, seeks
to render a notice of claim requirement operative, irrespective of the
existence of a tariff provision dealing therewith, it should express
such provision in full on the transportation ticket itself. It will thus
become a part of the contract of carriage, by which the passenger is
60258 U. S. 22 (1922).
61 102 F. Supp. 631 (S. D. Fla. 1952).
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bound, whether or not he actually reads it, for by his acceptance of
the ticket, he contracts with the carrier with respect to such provision.
Recent C. A. B. Developments
After the occurrence of a major airplane accident, suit was
brought in the United States District Court of Florida to recover
damages for personal injuries from the allegedly responsible carrier.6 2
The interposed defense consisted of an uncomplied-with provision
contained in the carrier's filed tariff to the effect that notice of claim
must be presented to the carrier within thirty days after the acci-
dent. The court ruled that the defense was effective to bar the suits
if the provision was lawful. Holding, however, that the Civil Aero-
nautics Board had primary jurisdiction as to the validity of the tariff
provision, the court stayed the proceedings until the plaintiffs could
obtain a ruling therefrom. The Board, in the proceeding in January,
1953,63 deliberately avoided the issue as to whether or not the pro-
vision in question was properly included in the air carrier's tariff as
being required or authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Act and the
Board's regulations thereunder. Instead, probably in view of the
fact that the foregoing issue was presently under investigation by the
Board, it assumed that the provision was properly included in the
tariff, and sought to determine whether or not the rule was reason-
able. The Board found that, in view of the facts that the provision
is not reasonably necessary for the carrier's protection, that it serves
as a device to defeat the normal liability of a common carrier, and
that it lends itself to discriminatory practices, the provision in question
".... is and always has been unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discrim-
inatory and therefore unlawful." 4 It may be noted, that the Board
declared the provision void as of its inception, thus permitting the
claimants to proceed with their actions before the courts, unhampered
by the use of the provision as a defense against them. Then too, it
may be added, the finding of the Board affected only the provision of
this air carrier's tariff, and had no automatic effect upon similar pro-
visions employed by other air carriers. Upon the rehearing before
the Board in May, 1953,65 the Board again refused to consider the
issue as to whether the provision can properly be included in a car-
rier's tariff. It stated that the claimants, in view of the Board's find-
ing the provision "always void," have obtained adequate relief, since
they may now freely pursue their remedies before the courts.
62 See Battista v. Continental Charters, Inc., 1952 U. S. & CAN. AVIATION
REP. 471 (S. D. Fla. 1952).
63 Continental Charters, Inc., Complaint of Battista, 1952 U. S. & CAN.
AVIATION REP. 472 (C. A. B. Docket No. 5573, 1953).64 Id. at 476.
65 Continental Charters, Inc., Complaint of Battista, 1953 U. S. & CAN.
AVIATioN REP. 196 (C. A. B. Docket No. 5573, 1953).
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Thus, one conclusion at least may be gleaned from the foregoing
proceedings. The Board considers a thirty-day notice of claim pro-
vision, with respect to personal injury claims, unlawful. However, as
to whether the provisions may be properly included in the carriers'
tariffs, the problem remains extant.
It appeared from the Board's decision, that at least two issues
are being investigated by it: (1) Whether such time provisions-
inclusive of time for suit requirements--can properly be included in
a carrier's tariff; 66 and (2) Whether a notice of claim provision as
to personal injury or death claims, other than the thirty-day clause
previously struck down, would be considered reasonable.6 Specifi-
cally, the clause under investigation provides, as to personal injuries
or death of a passenger, that written notice of claim be presented to
the general office of the carrier within ninety days after the accident,
and that the action be commenced within one year. 68
It has been recently noted that ".... six air carriers had volun-
tarily amended their filed tariffs so as to: (1) eliminate two 'personal
injury' rules . . . (2) lengthen the time periods: 45 days for notice
given at any office of the carrier; 2 years for suit . . " 69 The
foregoing in one aspect appears to be encouraging, namely, that dur-
ing the critical stage while the problem remains unsettled, the car-
riers indicate a willingness to compromise.
Besides the aforementioned investigation, the Civil Aeronautics
Board has, in July, 1953, proposed that its Economic Regulations be
amended so as to indicate clearly that time provisions, with respect
to personal injury and death claims, are not required to be included
in the carriers' filed tariffs. 70  The Board has not yet taken final ac-
tion on the proposed amendment. Section 2 2 1.4 (g) of the Board's
Economic Regulations 71 would be amended, by adding thereto: "No
provision of the Board's regulations ... shall be construed to require
* * . the filing of any tariff rule stating any limitation on, or
condition relating to, the carrier's liability for personal injury or
death .... , 72 This amendment, if passed, would appear to be the
solution to the problem.
Conclusion
The air carrier's utilization of notice of claim and time for suit
limitations is a necessary evil which must be tolerated. The carrier
needs and deserves the protective shield that it provides. Unless the
66 See note 63 supra at 474.
67 See note 63 mipra at 476.
68 Investigation of Tariff Liability Rules, 1953 U. S. & CAN. AviATION REP.
198 (C. A. B. Docket No. 6149, 1953).
69 See Note, 1952 U. S. & CAN. AviATION REP. 239.
70 CAB EcoNomic REGULATIONS, Draft Release No. 62 (July 22, 1953).
7' 14 CODE FE. REGs. § 2 2 1.4(g) (Rev. ed. 1952).
72 See note 70 srupra at 5.
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claimant is required to notify the carrier within a reasonable time
after an accident, as to the nature of the accident and his injuries, the
carrier may be unable to adequately defend itself, especially where
the staleness of the claim is enhanced by the postponement of the
suit. With the passage of time, an investigation by the carrier pro-
portionately becomes of lesser value, as evidence has been disturbed
or lost, passengers have dispersed in all directions, and the injuries
of fraudulent passengers have mysteriously multiplied. Stale claims
and delayed suits, therefore, were it not for the exaction of time pro-
visions, would provide the passenger with dual weapons, which it
could wield mercilessly upon the unprotected carrier.
Although the carrier, therefore, needs the protection of such time
provisions, it does not follow that it should use them unfairly. As
was pointed out earlier, time provisions have long been considered
valid, provided, of course, the period of time be reasonable. Orig-
inally, however, they were effective only when expressly agreed to
by the parties, i.e., the passenger actually knew the nature and extent
of the conditions with which he must comply. The theory was logi-
cally extended to situations where the provision appeared on the
transportation ticket, thus forming a part of the contract of carriage,
and effective to bind the passenger irrespective of his actual knowl-
edge thereof. In the foregoing situations, the passenger can be said
to have contracted with the carrier with respect to such provisions.
Thus, provided the time be reasonable, he cannot complain of the
consequences if he fails to comply.
It is sought today, however, to further extend the efficacy of
such time provisions. By the carrier's mere insertion of such provi-
sions in its filed tariff, it seeks to bind the passenger thereby, irre-
spective of his actual knowledge thereof. The history of the use of
time provisions rebels against the very heart of such a proposition.
It appears, however, that the time provisions are sought to be sus-
tained under either of two theories or both. (1) Under the doctrine
of incorporation by reference, the carrier, by impressing the legend
"sold subject to tariff regulations" upon the transportation ticket, pur-
ports to incorporate the time provisions into the contract of carriage,
thus binding the passenger irrespective of his actual knowledge
thereof. As mentioned earlier, the doctrine of incorporation by ref-
erence should not be applicable. Public policy demands that common
carriers make fair contracts with their passengers. "Sold subject to
tariff regulations" on the ticket would not seem to be an effective ref-
erence, especially in view of the fact that passengers would not ex-
pect to find such time provisions included in the carrier's filed tariff.
(2) The other theory by which the carriers seek to render time
provisions operative is by the mere effect of their being included as
a rule in their filed tariffs, thus purporting to bind the passengers as
a matter of law. This, of course, presupposes that a time provision
is a rule which is required to be included in the carrier's filed tariff.
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It would seem, as indicated earlier, that the Civil Aeronautics Act
and the regulations of the Board thereunder neither explicitly nor
impliedly require or authorize the inclusion of time provisions in the
carrier's filed tariff. It would follow that a passenger should not be
bound thereby as a matter of law. Were the rule otherwise, the
carrier would be a law unto itself.73  It could freely exact any type
of condition it desired, with the effect of binding the passenger
thereby, merely by inserting it in the carrier's filed tariff. The effect
of filing, however, cannot conceivably be elevated to such a high
dignity.
The bar provided by the enforcement of time provisions in per-
sonal injury and death actions has proved to have such devastating
repercussions, that Congress and the Civil Aeronautics Board could
not conceivably have contemplated the manner in which they are used,
unless it explicitly required their inclusion in carriers' tariffs. Pas-
sengers and their lawyers alike have been trapped, being unable to
guard against the consequences of such provisions, because they know
not of their existence. As to personal injury and death claims of
passengers against water carriers, the Shipping Act expressly permits
the use of time provisions.7 4 As to property damage claims against
railroad carriers, the Interstate Commerce Act expressly provides for
the use of time provisions."6 It would seem, therefore, that if Con-
gress through the Civil Aeronautics Act, or the Board thereunder,
through its Economic Regulations, intended that a time provision
was a rule which could properly be included in the carrier's filed tariff,
it most certainly would have explicitly so provided. Absence of ex-
press prohibition cannot be tortured to connote invitation. Rather
the rule is, or should be, that unless explicitly provided by statute or
the regulations of the administrative board thereunder, a common
carrier is powerless to act with respect to the public.
Since, however, the passenger is purportedly bound by such time
provisions which are unknown to him, it is plain to see that the effect
of including time provisions in its filed tariff enables the carrier to
escape liability for its wrongs to the public. It may thus be said that
the manner by which these provisions are rendered operative is
against public policy, and should not be condoned by the courts. 76
73 See Boston & M. R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 130 (1914) (dissenting
opinion).
74 49 STAT. 960 (1935), 46 U. S. C. § 183b (1946).
7546 STAT. 252 (1930), 49 U. S. C. §20(11) (1946).
76 "The rule [thirty-day notice of claim for personal injury of railroad
passenger] is a novel and cunning device to defeat the normal liability of car-
riers and should not be made a favorite of the courts." Gooch v. Oregon
Short Lines R. R., 258 U. S. 22, 32 (1922) (dissenting opinion-three justices).
It may be noticed, that in the Gooch case, the provision in question was the sub-
ject of express agreement between the parties. A fortiori, the manner by which
air carriers render such time provisions operative-by insertion of them in
their filed tariffs-should be considered all the more unfair, thus clearly against
public policy.
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